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Abstract
Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) allow for the correction of unmeasured con-
founding and function as a robustness check for difference-in-differences (DiD) techniques.
However, this technique is not scale invariant and requires that the outcome variable be
measured on units for which the treatment could have had no effect in either the pre-
treatment or post-treatment periods. Athey and Imbens (2006) provides a scale invariant,
nonlinear DiD approach known as Changes-in-Changes (CiC). Sofer et al. (2016) extends
CiC by showing that pre-treatment outcome measures are a special case of placebo (neg-
ative) outcomes and proposes a generalization of CiC called Negative Outcome Control
(NOC). We develop a generalized nonlinear DiDiD approach we call NOCNOC that can
be used either in the traditional DiDiD setting or when a placebo outcome is available
in the pre and post-treatment data. We show that NOCNOC can correct for bias in Di-
DiD, CiC, and NOC. We apply this method to a study of whether exposure to candidate
debates affected Nepalese citizens’ sense of political efficacy.
1 Introduction
Difference-in-difference-in-differences (DiDiD) allow for the correction of unmeasured
confounding. However, this technique is not scale invariant and requires the outcome
variable to be measured on “treated” observations for which the treatment could have had
no effect in either the pre-treatment or post-treatment periods. Often, these observations
are individuals who would have been ineligible for the treatment, for example, due to a
minimum age requirement or maximum age limit.
In this paper, we discuss a generalized nonlinear DiDiD approach. This builds on
Sofer, Richardson, Colicino, Schwartz & Tchetgen (2016), which showed how the changes-
in-changes model (CiC) of non-linear DiD (Athey & Imbens 2006) could be generalized to
allow the use of placebo outcomes in lieu of pre-treatment measurements of the outcome.
The Sofer et al. (2016) approach, which they call negative outcome control (NOC), relies
on placebo outcomes – outcomes that the treatment should not affect and for which the
confounding should equal the confounding of primary outcomes on the quantile scale.
For example, Sofer et al. (2016) uses body mass index (BMI) as a placebo outcome to
help estimate the effect of black carbon exposure due to air pollution on fibrinogen (blood
inflammation). There is likely unmeasured confounding of the relationship between black
carbon and fibrinogen because those living in areas exposed to high levels of black carbon
are also likely to have other risk factors for fibrinogen. BMI may serve as a useful placebo
outcome because it is unlikely to be directly affected by black carbon, but it is likely to
share many of the same confounding factors as fibrinogen.
We extend the Athey & Imbens (2006) and Sofer et al. (2016) approaches to the DiDiD
context and demonstrate this in detail using placebo (negative) outcomes. We develop a
method to relax the Sofer et al. (2016) assumption of quantile-quantile primary-placebo
equi-confounding by using pre- and post-treatment data. This approach, which we call the
NOCNOC, is non-linear, scale invariant, and can be used in traditional DiDiD settings
or with placebo outcomes. We show using simulations that NOCNOC can correct for
bias in traditional linear DiDiD, CiC, and NOC. We also apply this method to analyze
whether exposure to candidate debates affected the political efficacy of Nepalese citizens.
We use political knowledge as a placebo outcome, despite the fact that first, exposure
to the debates may have had some small effect on knowledge, and second, it is difficult
to determine ex ante whether cross-sectional confounding would be equal for political
efficacy and knowledge. Using pre-treatment measures of both political efficacy and
knowledge with our NOCNOC estimator, we demonstrate that exposure to candidate
debates likely had no effect on political efficacy, even though DiD analysis with placebo
tests in conventional practice suggested a positive effect.
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2 Review of Changes-in-Changes (CiC) and Nega-
tive Outcome Control (NOC)
Define the outcome variable Yat for action/treatment group a = {0, 1} (control, treat-
ment) at time t = {0, 1} (pre-treatment, post-treatment). Then the linear DiD estimator
can be written as the following:
(Ê[Y11]− Ê[Y01])− (Ê[Y10]− Ê[Y00])
= Ê[Y11]− (Ê[Y01] + (Ê[Y10]− Ê[Y00])) (1)
This is an estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT) in the post-
treatment period, which can be defined in terms of the missing potential outcomes Y11(0),
the outcome that would have occured for the treated units in the post-treatment period
if they had been assigned control. With this notation, the ATT is:
E[Y11]− E[Y11(0)] (2)
Note that Ê[Y11] in (1) is simply the mean outcome among the treated units in the
post-treatment period and is a plug-in estimator for E[Y11] in (2). The difficult task
is the estimation of the second term in (2), the mean of the missing potential outcomes
E[Y11(0)]. The linear DiD approach estimates this quantity with Ê[Y01]+(Ê[Y10]−Ê[Y00])
from (1), where Ê[Y10] − Ê[Y00] is the correction for the confounding. Note also that
although we do not include notation for covariates in this paper, nonparametric use of
covariates could be easily incorporated by conditioning the expectations on values of the
covariates.
2.1 Changes-in-Changes (CiC)
Athey & Imbens (2006)’s CiC procedure is a nonlinear DiD approach to the correction
for unmeasured confounding. It generalizes the linear DiD in the following way:
Ê[Y11]− 1
k10
k10∑
i=1
Fˆ−1Y01(FˆY00(Y10,i)) (3)
where k10 is the number of treated units in the pre-treatment period, FˆY00 represents a
consistent estimator of the CDF from the control units in the pre-treatment period, and
Fˆ−1Y01 represents a consistent esimator of the inverse CDF from the control units in the
post-treatment period. Note that the second term from (3) is analogous to the second
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term in the linear DiD estimator in (1) and estimates the second term of the ATT in (2).
Note also that although we do not include notation for covariates, nonparametric use of
covariates could be easily incorporated by conditioning the CDFs and inverse CDFs on
values of the covariates.
Figure 1: CiC procedure for imputing Y (0) for quantile q (F−1Y11(0)(q))
Y00 Y01
yCIC
Y10
y10
q
Consider what the second term of (3) is doing for a particular quantile q. For example,
suppose we want to impute the missing potential outcome for q = .4. The associated CiC
procedure is presented in Figure 1. We take the y value associated with the .4 quantile
among the treated units in the pre-treatment period (y10 in the figure). We calculate
what quantile that value would take among the control units in the pre-treatment period
(roughly .5 in the figure). We then assume the imputed value should be at the same
quantile among the controls in the post-treatment period as in the pre-treatment period
(indicated by the horizontal line between the Y00 and Y01 in the figure). Finally, we
calculate the y value associated with the .5 quantile among the controls in the post-
treatment period (the yCiC in the figure).
Intuitively, the CiC procedure uses the pre-treatment period to measure confounding
on the quantile scale by showing how far the quantiles move from the treatment group
to the control group (.4 to .5 in the figure). This is then used to impute the missing
potential outcome in the post-treatment period. Athey & Imbens (2006) provides a set
of assumptions under which (3) is consistent for ATT, and Sofer et al. (2016) weakens
these assumptions. Here we provide an illustrative reduced form of the Sofer et al.
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Figure 2: CiC quantile-quantile pre-post equi-confounding assumption for quantile q
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(2016) assumptions extracted from their proof.1 The underlying assumption is that the
confounding in the pre-treatment period equals the confounding in the post-treatment
period on the quantile scale (i.e., time-invariant confounding). For a particular quantile
q, this assumption is depicted in Figure 2, where the move from quantile q among the
treated units in the pre-treatment period to quantile ν among the control units in the pre-
treatment period is assumed to mirror the move from quantile q in the missing potential
outcomes to quantile ν ′ among the control units in the post-treatment period. However,
for ATT, this assumption only needs to hold on average across the quantiles.
2.2 Negative Outcome Control (NOC)
Without covariates, Sofer et al. (2016)’s NOC procedure is very similar to the CiC
procedure. The pre-treatment outcomes, Y10 and Y00, are replaced with post-treatment
placebo (negative) outcomes, N11 and N01. Sofer et al. (2016)’s application, for exam-
ple, is cross-sectional in the post-treatment period: fibrinogen (the primary outcome Y )
and BMI (the placebo/negative outcome N) are both measured after exposure to black
carbon. Hence, the NOC procedure is the following:
1The more expansive assumptions of Athey & Imbens (2006) and Sofer et al. (2016) provide more
detail in terms of data generating processes that would satisfy these reduced form assumptions.
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Ê[Y11]− 1
k11
k11∑
i=1
Fˆ−1Y01(FˆN01(N11,i)) (4)
where k11 is the number of treated units in the post-treatment period, FˆN01 represents a
consistent estimator of the CDF for the placebo outcome from the control units in the
post-treatment period, and Fˆ−1Y01 represents a consistent estimator of the inverse CDF for
the primary outcome for the control units in the post-treatment period. Note that the
second term in (4) is analogous to the second term in (3).
Figure 3: NOC procedure for imputing Y (0) for quantile q (F−1Y11(0)(q))
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yNOC
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Again, we can build intuition about the NOC by considering what the second term
of (4) is doing for a particular quantile q. For example, suppose we want to impute the
missing potential outcome for q = .4. The associated NOC procedure is presented in
Figure 3. We take the y value associated with the .4 quantile for the placebo outcome
among the treated units in the post-treatment period (n11 in the figure). We calculate
what quantile that placebo outcome value would take among the control units in the post-
treatment period (roughly .6 in the figure). We then assume the imputed value should be
at the same quantile among the controls for the primary outcome in the post-treatment
period as among the placebo outcome in the same post-treatment period (horizontal line
between the N01 and Y01 in the figure). Finally, we calculate the y value associated with
the .6 quantile among the controls in the post-treatment period (the yNOC in the figure).
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The formal statement of this assumption is stated below (and as before, the support of
the control units must contain the support of the treated units):
Figure 4: NOC quantile-quantile placebo-primary equi-confounding assumption for quan-
tile q
N01
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Y01
  ν′
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n11
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Intuitively, the placebo outcome plots measure the confounding on the quantile scale
by showing how far the quantiles move from the treatment group to the control group
(.4 to .6 in the figure). This makes sense as a measure of confounding because the
treatment should not affect a placebo outcome. This .6 is then used to impute the missing
potential outcome in the post-treatment period. Again, the underlying assumption for
the NOC procedure is a quantile-quantile equi-confounding assumption, except that now
the equality of confounding is assumed between the placebo outcome and the primary
outcome. In the CiC procedure, the equal confounding is assumed across time. This
NOC assumption is depicted for a particular quantile q in Figure 4. Finally, as before we
only need this assumption to hold on average when estimating ATT.
3 Generalizing the DiDiD Approach
If we allow N to denote either a placebo outcome as before, or alternatively measure-
ments of Y on units for which the treatment should have no effect (e.g., those that miss
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an eligibility cutoff), the standard linear DiDiD estimator can be written as the following:
(Ê[Y11]− Ê[Y01])− (Ê[Y10]− Ê[Y00])− {(Ê[N11]− Ê[N01])− (Ê[N10]− Ê[N00])}
= (Ê[Y11]− Ê[Y01])− (Ê[N11]− Ê[N01])− {(Ê[Y10]− Ê[Y00])− (Ê[N10]− Ê[N00])}
(5)
= Ê[Y11]−
[
Ê[Y01] + (Ê[N11]− Ê[N01])− {(Ê[N10]− Ê[N00])− (Ê[Y10]− Ê[Y00])}
]
(6)
Again, this is an estimator for ATT in the post-treatment period (E[Y11]−E[Y11(0)]). If
we write the estimator as in (5), then the first half of the estimator ((Ê[Y11]− Ê[Y01])−
(Ê[N11]− Ê[N01])) can be seen as a linear NOC approach in the post-treatment period,
while the second half ({(Ê[Y10]−Ê[Y00])−(Ê[N10]−Ê[N00])}) can be seen as a linear NOC
approach in the pre-treatment period. Alternatively, in (6) Ê[Y11] is a plug-in estimator
for the first term of ATT and the linear DiDiD approach estimates the second term of
ATT with everything in the large square brackets from (6). One thing this notation
makes clear is that (6) has the potential to be quite biased when N is measured on a
different scale than Y , which is likely to be the case when N is a placebo outcome.
Given the apparent problems with the linear DiDiD estimator, we introduce a non-
linear DiDiD estimator for ATT that we call the NOCNOC estimator:
1
k11
k11∑
i=1
Y11,i − 1
k10
k10∑
i=1
Fˆ−1Y01(FˆN01(Fˆ
−1
N11
(FˆN10(Fˆ
−1
N00
(FˆY00(Y10,i)))))) (7)
Note that this estimator has a similar form to (6), and hence the fundamental idea behind
the NOCNOC estimator is to correct inconsistency in the NOC estimator in the post-
treatment period, with estimates from the NOC estimator in the pre-treatment period.
In this sense, NOCNOC will work well when the differential in confounding between the
primary and placebo outcome is time-invariant.
NOCNOC is depicted in Figure 5. Suppose we want to estimate Y11(0) for a particular
quantile q. This is accomplished by starting with the quantile q pre-treatment primary
outcome in the treated group (Y10) and asking what quantile q
′ among the pre-treatment
values of the placebo in the treated group (N10) would have produced that Y10. This
process can be seen by following the blue path in the lower part of Figure 5. Then the
estimated q′ is used instead of q to start the NOC process in the post-treatment period.
This process can be seen by the blue path in the upper part of Figure 5. For comparative
purposes, NOC process is represented by the red path in the upper part of of Figure 5.
The fundamental difference between the procedures is that NOC starts with quantile q in
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the post-treatment placebo distribution (N11) and NOCNOC uses quantile q
′ in the post-
treatment placebo distribution (N11), having estimated this quantile in the pre-treatment
period.
Figure 5: NOCNOC estimator procedure for imputing Y (0) for quantile q (F−1Y11(0)(q))
N01 Y01
yNOC yNOCNOC
N10q'
N11
n11
q
Y10
N00 Y00
The reduced form assumptions of the NOCNOC estimator are presented in Assump-
tions 1a and 1b below:
Assumption 1a.
FN11(F
−1
N01
(FY01(F
−1
Y11(0)
(q)))) = FN10(F
−1
N00
(FY00(F
−1
Y10
(q)))), q ∈ [0, 1]
Assumption 1b.
if 0 < fY10(y10), then 0 < FY00(y10) < 1,
0 < FN10(F
−1
N00
(FY00(y10))) < 1, and
0 < FN01(F
−1
N11
(FN10(F
−1
N00
(FY00(y10))))) < 1
Assumption 1a is visualized in Figure 6 for a particular value of q. The assumption
holds in this case, with the output from the left hand side of Assumption 1a depicted
on the figure as q′, the output from the right hand side of Assumption 1a depicted on
the figure as q′′, and q′ = q′′. The assumption means that the confounding generated
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on the quantile scale is equal for the NOC process in the post-treatment period and the
pre-treatment period.
Figure 6: Placebo outcome NOCNOC assumption for imputing Y (0) for quantile q
(F−1Y11(0)(q))
N01 Y01
N10
q''
N11
q'
Y11(0)
q
Y10
N00 Y00
Assumption 1b states the support conditions for the NOCNOC estimator, and these
ensure that the CDFs never output negative or positive infinity. For the NOCNOC,
the support for the treated units in the pre-treatment period must be contained in the
support of the controls in the pre-treatment period. In addition, quantiles implied by
the treated units in the pre-treatment period must also be in the support of the placebo
outcomes in the manner presented.
Alternatively, Assumption 1a can be microfounded in terms of unmeasured con-
founders as in the Sofer et al. (2016) proof:
Assumption 2a.
Nat(a) = Nat for a = 0, 1
Yat(a) = Yat if A = a
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Assumption 2b.
At ⊥ Yt(0)|Ut for t = 0, 1
At ⊥ Nt|Wt for t = 0, 1
Assumption 2c.
Yat(0) = hyt(Uat) where hyt(Uat) is monotone increasing
Nat = hnt(Wat) where hnt(Wat) is monotone increasing
Assumption 2d.
FW11(F
−1
W01
(FU01(F
−1
U11(0)
(q)))) = FW10(F
−1
W00
(FU00(F
−1
U10
(q)))), q ∈ [0, 1]
If Assumptions 2a, 2b, 2c, and 2d hold, then the proof in Sofer et al. (2016) implies
that Assumption 1a holds. These assumptions also illustrate our approach to simulation
in the next section. The following theorem establishes the consistency of the NOCNOC
estimator. The proof is in Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Under Assumptions 1a and 1b, the NOCNOC estimator is consistent for
ATT.
4 Simulation Study
In order to assess the performance of the NOCNOC estimator, we ran a number
of simulations where pre- and post-treatment data were available for both a primary
outcome and a placebo outcome. In the first set of simulations, we generated data
consistent with the linear DiDiD model. These results are presented in Figure 7, and we
see that as expected the NOCNOC does well in comparison to the linear DiDiD, although
the linear approach is more efficient. In the second set of simulations, we generated data
consistent with the CiC model. These results are presented in Figure 8, and we see
that CiC does well, while NOC, and the linear DiDiD perform quite poorly for some
specifications. NOCNOC does well but the CiC approach is more efficient. In the third
set of simulations, we generated data consistent with the NOC model. These results
are presented in Figure 9, and we see that NOC does well, while CiC and the linear
DiDiD perform poorly. Again, NOCNOC does well but the NOC approach is slightly
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more efficient. Finally, we present simulations with generated data consistent with only
the NOCNOC model. These results are presented in Figure 10, and only the NOCNOC
estimator performs well.
Figure 7: Simulation results for data consistent with a linear DiDiD model.
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Sample Size
Ab
so
lu
te
 B
ia
s
500 1000 4000
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1
2 2 2
2 2 2
2 2 0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Sample Size
R
M
SE
500 1000 4000
0 0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
1 1 1
1 1 1
1
1
1
2 2 2
2 2
2
2
2
2
l l l l lLinear DiD CiC NOC Linear DiDiD NOCNOC
The results of these simulation studies provide some guidance as to the potential choice
of estimator. The main finding is that for bias, the NOCNOC estimator nearly weakly
dominates all other estimators over all simulations at large sample sizes. In particular, all
the other estimators have catastrophic failures for at least some of the simulations, while
NOCNOC never does. Furthermore, the NOCNOC has reasonable root mean squared
error, so not a great amount of efficiency is lost in using the most robust model.
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Figure 8: Simulation results for data consistent with a CiC model.
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5 Debate Exposure and Political Efficacy in Nepal
Nepal is a country of approximately 29 million that experienced civil war from 1996
to 2006 and was a monarchy until 2008. In December 2017, Nepal held local and national
elections for the first time under a new constitution that established it as a federal,
multi-ethnic republic. As part of an effort to strengthen the connections between citizens
and their representatives and to encourage issue-oriented rather than personality-centered
politics, the Samriddhi Foundation, a Nepalese civil society organization, hosted televised
debates among candidates for the House of Representatives (the directly-elected lower
house of parliament) for three single-member constituencies within Kanchanpur, Jhapa,
and Sunsari districts in November 2017. A community radio station in each of these rural
districts invited 1000 randomly-selected citizens to a public venue to view a screening of
the recorded candidate debate for their area and/or participate in small-group discussions
12
Figure 9: Simulation results for data consistent with an NOC model.
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about the candidates and issues.2 Recent randomized studies in Ghana, Sierra Leone,
and Uganda, where candidate debates are also relatively novel, have found that exposure
to candidate debates (sometimes followed by community discussion) increased voters’
knowledge about the candidates and their policies and affected how they voted in some
contexts (Bidwell, Casey & Glennerster 2016, Brierley, Kramon & Ofosu 2018, Platas &
Raﬄer 2017).
To illustrate our method for DiDiD with placebo outcomes, we assess whether ex-
posure to the candidate debates ahead of these historic elections affected a related but
different outcome – citizens’ sense of political efficacy. Political efficacy – the sense that
one can influence politics and government (external) and that one can understand politics
and government (internal) – is associated with political participation (Campbell, Gurin
2The debates were edited for length and to even out the screen time across candidates.
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Figure 10: Simulation results for data consistent with a NOCNOC model.
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& Miller 1954, Almond & Verba 1963, Rosenstone & Hansen 1993, Verba, Schlozman
& Brady 1995). Low efficacy could create the danger that citizens will fail participate
in politics and hold their politicians accountable, leading politicians to learn that they
can fail to serve voters and instead serve private interests with little electoral conse-
quence. But involvement in political activities itself could enhance citizens’ sense of
efficacy (Finkel 1985, Valentino, Gregorowicz & Groenendyk 2009), and we consider the
impact of exposure to these debates.
This analysis uses data for 223 respondents who attended one of the events and
were randomized into the debate screening condition, along with 510 respondents who
signed up for but did not attend the events, for whom we have measures of all items
used to construct primary and placebo outcomes both pre- and post-treatment. These
respondents were initially interviewed at their homes in November 2017; signed up for an
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event to be held between November 21 and 27, 2017; and were re-interviewed mostly at
their homes in January/February 2018. Excluded are those attendees who were assigned
to other treatment arms that included small-group discussions as part of the larger study
and those participants who had signed up for dates for which we had to cancel the
events. We use pre- and post-treatment data collected on the same units, but this is not
necessary for our methods. It is only necessary that the primary and placebo outcomes
are measured on the same units within each cross-section.
A first tack at this question would compare the efficacy of attendees and non-attendees
of these events after the treatment, and we find that the difference-in-means is 0.0733
(0.0247).3 Although all respondents signed up for an event date that was convenient for
them, attendance was not randomized and we expect those who attended these events
to differ from those who do not in important respects. Those who have less interest in
politics or have lower efficacy and think that the event will have smaller benefits for them
are less likely to take the time to travel and participate in these events. Indeed, differences
between attendees and non-attendees in efficacy at baseline provide some evidence for this
confounding problem. At baseline, the mean efficacy index were 0.5669 for attendees and
0.5345 for non-attendees, respectively (Table 1). This gives us a difference-in-difference
estimate of 0.0408 (0.0231), an apparent effect significant at the 90% level. Furthermore,
even if we use the more robust Athey & Imbens (2006)’s CiC model we get an ATT
estimate of 0.0448 (0.0245, standard error from 1000 bootstrap samples).4 It appears
from these estimates that debates have an effect on efficacy.
However, even the CiC estimate is only valid if the quantile-quantile pre-post equicon-
founding assumption holds on average. Fortunately, we have a placebo outcome that can
be used to assess this assumption. This is an index of knowledge of aspects of politics
and government that were not discussed in the debate, which is likely to suffer from
confounding similar to political efficacy. Respondents were asked how many levels of
government Nepal has under the new constitution, how many legislative bodies Nepal
has at the national level under the new constitution, and asked to list as many as they
3Our political efficacy index is a measure of both external and internal efficacy. External efficacy,
the sense that one can influence politics and government, is measured on a 5-point scale from strongly
agree to strongly disagree with the statement “I feel I can influence political decisions that affect my
life.” Internal political efficacy, which is the sense that one can understand political affairs, is measured
in two ways. The first is on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree with the statement
“I feel I am as well-informed about politics and government as most people.” The second is whether
the respondent agrees more with the statement “Politics is complicated and I usually do not understand
what politicians are doing,” or “Most of the time I understand what politicians are doing.” These items
are rescaled so that each has a minimum of 0 and maximum of 1 and averaged to generate an index of
political efficacy.
4To apply this model, we add a small amount of random noise (0.04σ) to break ties and create a
more continuous measure of our outcomes. Then for each attendee, we determine at what quantile this
pre-treatment efficacy level would fall in the distribution of pre-treatment efficacy for non-attendees.
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Table 1: Pre- and Post-Treatment Data from Nepal Debate Study
Number of attendees (treated) 223
Number of non-attendees (control) 510
Post-treatment:
Political efficacy index (treated) mean 0.5643, min 0, max 1
Political efficacy index (control) mean 0.4910, min 0, max 1
Knowledge index (treated) mean 3.4215, min 0, max 11
Knowledge index (control) mean 2.9980, min 0, max 12
Pre-treatment:
Political efficacy index (treated) mean 0.5669, min 0.0833, max 1
Political efficacy index (control) mean 0.5345, min 0, max 1
Knowledge index (treated) mean 3.1300, min 1, max 14
Knowledge index (control) mean 2.7922, min 1, max 13
could of the responsibilities and power of local governments under the new constitution.5
The debates were held after the local government elections and featured only candidates
for the federal-level House of Representatives. They did not mention the elections for the
provincial-level State Assemblies being held concurrently or the federal-level National As-
sembly which were to be held later. Therefore, we expect the debates or discussion to not
affect knowledge on these particular items, unlike for knowledge on candidate platforms
and other information that were presented during the debates. Political efficacy and
knowledge are closely related, since those with less interest in politics or lower efficacy
are less likely to seek out information, pay attention to information, or participate in
activities that would expose them to information that they don’t expect to understand
well or find useful.
A DiD analysis on knowledge constitutes a classic placebo test. It appears that we
“pass” this placebo test with a statistically insignificant estimate of 0.0856 (0.1855).
Although these tests are widely used, it is unclear how well they protect us against
unmeasured confounding. In a recent advance, Hartman & Hidalgo (2018) have proposed
moving away from null hypotheses of no difference in variables that should be unaffected
by the treatment, and instead testing a null hypothesis of difference in those variables
against an alternative hypothesis of equivalence between treated and control groups.
Instead of using placebo outcomes to test for the validity of the research design, Sofer
et al. (2016)’s negative outcome control (NOC) approach uses a placebo outcome that is
assumed to have the same confounding as the primary outcome on the quantile scale to
correct for the confounding. The Sofer et al. (2016) procedure is represented in Figure 3.
We would take the knowledge index level for an attendee n11 and find its quantile amongst
5Each correct answer is given one point, with a possible maximum of 16.
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the distribution of knowledge for the non-attendees. Then the imputed counterfactual
outcome yNOC for the attendee with n11 would be the value at that same quantile in the
distribution of political efficacy for the non-attendees. Attendees with knowledge index
values greater (smaller) than that observed amongst non-attendees will be assigned the
largest (smallest) efficacy value observed amongst non-attendees as their counterfactual
efficacy values. The average of the differences between the observed outcomes and these
counterfactual outcomes for the attendees is the NOC approach’s estimated ATT, 0.0040
(0.0287).
Table 2: Summary of Results
Estimate S.E.
Mean difference in post-treatment political efficacy (Y ) 0.0733 (0.0247)
Linear DiD on political efficacy (Y ) 0.0408 (0.0231)
CiC on political efficacy (Y ) 0.0448 (0.0245)
Linear DiD on knowledge (N) 0.0856 (0.1855)
Post-treatment NOC 0.0040 (0.0287)
NOCNOC 0.0258 (0.0387)
We can use our NOCNOC estimator to relax the primary-placebo equi-confounding
assumption to an assumption of time-invariant differential primary-placebo confounding.
The NOCNOC procedure is visualized with the blue line segments in Figure 5 in earlier
Section 3. For each attendee’s pre-treatment efficacy value, we determine at what quantile
in the distribution of the pre-treatment efficacy for the non-attendees it would fall. Then
we find the knowledge level associated with that quantile, and then where this knowledge
level would be in the distribution of pre-treatment knowledge for attendees. This second
quantile then becomes the starting point for the second portion of the procedure, which
is the NOC procedure. There is no treatment effect in the pre-treatment period, so
we are effectively backing out the confounding on the quantile scale through the first
portion of the procedure to carry through in the second portion. By subtracting the
mean NOCNOC estimates for the counterfactual outcomes from the mean post-treatment
efficacy for the attendees, we get an ATT estimate of 0.0258 (0.0387, standard error from
1000 bootstrap samples). This again indicates that exposure to debate screenings had no
effect on political efficacy.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we extended the Athey & Imbens (2006) and Sofer et al. (2016) ap-
proaches to DiD to a DiDiD context. This generalized nonlinear DiDiD approach we
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call NOCNOC can be used either in the traditional DiDiD setting or when a placebo
outcome is available in the pre and post-treatment data. We show that NOCNOC can
correct for bias in DiDiD, CiC, and NOC. In the application, we used these methods to
analyze whether exposure to candidate debates discussions affected the political efficacy
of Nepalese citizens, using political knowledge as a placebo outcome. Using pre-treatment
measures of both political efficacy and knowledge, we found that exposure to candidate
debates likely had no effect on political efficacy, even though traditional DiD analysis
with placebo tests in conventional practice suggested a positive effect.
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A Proof of Theorem 1
We can rewrite Assumption 1a in the following way:
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where the right hand side of the last equation corresponds to the second term in the
NOCNOC estimator. If we further have the support conditions in Assumption 1b, then
all observed values of Y10 will produce non-infinite values of this expression. Finally, if
we have consistent estimators of the component CDFs and inverse CDFs via standard
statistical theory, then NOCNOC provides a consistent estimator of ATT.
B Simulation Details
For Figure 7, we generated data from the following model:
Yat = Uat + aβ, where U |A ∼ N(η0 − δ(1− t) + θ1at+ θ2(1− t)a, 3− a
2
)
Nat = Wat, where W |A ∼ N(η0 − δ(1− t) + θ3at+ θ4(1− t)a, 3− a
2
)
for a = {0, 1}, t = {0, 1}. θ is set to (3, 2, 2, 1).
For Figures 8 – 10, we generated data from the following model:
Yat = (Uat + 1)
2 + aβ, where U |A ∼ N(η0 − δ(1− t) + θ1at+ θ2(1− t)a, 3− a
2
)
Nat = Wat, where W |A ∼ N(η0 − δ(1− t) + θ3at+ θ4(1− t)a, 3− a
2
)
for a = {0, 1}, t = {0, 1}. θ is set to (3, 3, 2, 2) for Table 8, to (3,2,3,2) for Table 9, and
to (3,2,2,1) for Table 10.
In all models, the treatment effect is β and additive. U and W are the unobserved
confounders for the treatment with the primary and placebo outcomes, respectively. Y
and N are each functions of time (pre/post-treatment) and an unobserved confounder,
and both strictly monotonically increasing in the confounder. The confounding bias
across treatment groups, over time, and across outcomes is given by the differences in the
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means of U and W . To ensure support, we set the treatment effect at β = 1, η0 = 12,
δ = {0, 1, 2}, and standard deviations of the unmeasured confounders are larger for the
controls than for the treated group. We generate data for n1 = 500, 1000, and 4000
treated observations and n0 = 2n1 control observations. We compare bias and RMSE
of the linear differences-in-differences estimator, the CiC estimator, the NOC estimator,
the linear DiDiD estimator, and the NOCNOC estimator, with 5000 simulations.
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